Affiliation:
1. Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford
2. Department of Political Economy, King’s College London
3. Department of Political Economy & Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, King’s College London
Abstract
In late developing states, labor markets are often segmented as a result of import substitution and political coalitions centered on the formally employed. Building on insider–outsider and moral economy frameworks from political economy, we theorize that in such contexts labor market insiders develop strong expectations about welfare provision and public transfers that make them more likely to riot against proposed austerity measures. We test our argument with the case of Egypt during the 1977 Bread Intifada, when the announcement of subsidy cuts sparked rioting across the country. To conduct our analysis, we match an original event catalog compiled from Arabic-language sources with disaggregated employment data. Spatial models, rich micro-level data, and the sudden and short-lived nature of the rioting help us to disentangle the importance of an area’s labor force from its location and wider socio-economic context. As we show, despite the diffuse impact of the subsidy cuts, rioting was especially concentrated in areas with labor market insiders – and this is after accounting for a range of plausible alternative explanations. The results suggest that moral economies arising from labor market segmentation can powerfully structure violent opposition to austerity.
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Safety Research,Sociology and Political Science
Reference80 articles.
1. Voting in Transition: Participation and Alienation in Egypt’s 2012 Presidential Election
2. Adly Amr (2014) The Sisi Government’s Attempts to Win Over Egypt’s Civil Servants (http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=56462).
3. The Democratic Window of Opportunity
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献