Regulatory capture of the Chinese social credit system: Bureaucratic self-interests in project implementation

Abstract

The construction of China’s social credit system (SCS) involves numerous bureaucratic agents who develop mechanisms aimed at contributing to the SCS’s overall objective of building mutual trust in society. This article traces the development of centrally designed censorship-related SCS mechanisms and examines them in a broader regulatory context. In doing so, we examine the effects that single SCS solutions produce for particular areas of governance, and the impact of bureaucratic interests on the proposed mechanisms and the entire SCS. The findings reveal that agents design mechanisms which support the underlying logic of their governance areas but which often diverge from the core SCS assumption of strengthening trustworthiness in society by raising the cost of violating legal provisions. This article also argues that, despite the trend towards centralization and controlling institutions, the ability of the Chinese party-state to develop a novel, complex, and coherent project may already be compromised at the central level due to the interplay of bureaucratic self-interests. Even though constructing the SCS has involved testing and introducing innovative mechanisms, these often fail to serve the project’s core assumption. As a result, long-existing mechanisms that now serve the SCS punitive regime may be more potent than the novel solutions in raising the cost of violating legal provisions.