Lucky Beneficiaries or Collateral Damage? The Irregular Timing and Arrangement of Chinese Watchdog Agencies

Abstract

Exemplified by China’s installation of its National Supervisory Commission, the rise and fall of the Chinese anti-corruption apparatus remains puzzlingly changeable, which contrasts with the calls for its institutionalization. For a country known for informal politics, the role played by politicians behind such a seemingly irregular evolution remains inadequately examined. This research attempts to explain the elite struggle’s influence on Chinese watchdog agencies using a factional framework. From a historical institutional perspective, this research summarizes several patterns of the Leninist party chief’s interaction with watchdog agencies in different factional structures governing the institutional evolution. The analysis finds that the agency’s power is contingent on its factional relationship with the chief, and only specific structures favor “super” watchdog agencies. This research adds to the theoretical understanding of how contingencies shape institutional development and underlines empirical facts about the vulnerability of Chinese anti-corruption institutions.