Evolutionary dynamics of competition among ports in networks

Abstract

The competitive relationships among ports become complicated as the consequence of the prosperity of international trade. Typical oligopoly competition models cannot be competent for the analysis of ports competition in real scenario. In this paper, the scale-free network is adopted to characterize the interactions among ports with various number of neighbors. For each port node, not only direct competition but also indirect influences exerted by its neighbor are taken into account. Following the hypothesis in evolutionary game theory, social learning behavior among competitors occurs generally in our model. Conforming to reality, strategies considering both price collusion and price competition are proposed to investigate evolutionary dynamics of competition among ports in the self-organization process of imitation. It shows that neighbors have the same goal but play different roles in affecting strategy transition during the evolution with two competitive means. We explore how evolutionary dynamics are influenced by different imitation means. Then this paper verifies that price collusion is more conducive to port development when abundant resources is provided. Our results obtained in this evolutionary framework with different imitation means may enhance port-operation efficiency.