The Guardian of the Constitution

Author:

Schupmann Benjamin A

Abstract

Abstract This chapter analyses the guardian of the constitution, the third principal mechanism of militant democracy. Typically embodied by the constitutional court, the guardian holds pro tempore final authority on constitutionality. This role is vital for militant democracy: since neither unamendability nor political rights restrictions are self-enforcing, some constituted power must adjudicate on them. The chapter argues that guardianship should rest with a branch independent of the executive and legislative branches. By representing ‘the people’ in a fundamentally different manner from those branches, the guardian can effectively counterbalance imperfections of their representations. This serves as a robust check on the potential pathologies of those branches, thereby safeguarding the democratic ideals of ‘the people’ and protecting against threats like legal revolution and democratic cannibalism.

Publisher

Oxford University PressOxford

Reference338 articles.

1. Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude;American Journal of Comparative Law,2014

2. Constitutional Handcuffs;Arizona State Law Journal,2010

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