Abstract
The 2020 Economics Nobel Prize was awarded to Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson. Both laureates have made seminal, crucial contributions to auction theory and practical market design. Here, we briefly describe those contributions and their significance within the general context of auction theory and practice. We also review the laureates’ substantial and highly influential work in other areas of economics.
Publisher
EdiUNS - Editorial de la Universidad Nacional del Sur
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