Mental Health Experts as Objects of Epistemic Injustice—The Case of Autism Spectrum Condition

Abstract

This theoretical paper addresses the issue of epistemic injustice with particular reference to autism. Injustice is epistemic when harm is performed without adequate reason and is caused by or related to access to knowledge production and processing, e.g., concerning racial or ethnic minorities or patients. The paper argues that both mental health service users and providers can be subject to epistemic injustice. Cognitive diagnostic errors often appear when complex decisions are made in a limited timeframe. In those situations, the socially dominant ways of thinking about mental disorders and half-automated and operationalized diagnostic paradigms imprint on experts’ decision-making processes. Recently, analyses have focused on how power operates in the service user–provider relationship. It was observed that cognitive injustice inflicts on patients through the lack of consideration of their first-person perspectives, denial of epistemic authority, and even epistemic subject status, among others. This paper shifts focus toward health professionals as rarely considered objects of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice affects mental health providers by harming their access to and use of knowledge in their professional activities, thus affecting the reliability of their diagnostic assessments.