Research on Collaborative Risk Management Mechanism of Mega Projects: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model Considering the Participation of Insurance Institution

Abstract

The frequent occurrence of mega project accidents has created an issue of risk management and has made its solution highly valued. In the case that the owner is at a regulatory disadvantage, insurance institution can provide a new pattern for risk management of mega projects. The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of insurance institution’s participation in mega project risk management on the decision-making of all participants and the promotion of the overall effectiveness of collaborative risk management of all participants. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model between the insurance institution, supervision unit and contractor, the conditions of the behavior evolution process of each participant and the important parameters affecting the change in behavior strategies are analyzed. The results indicate that the participation of insurance institution can promote the risk management investment of the supervision unit and contractor, and punitive measures can make participants pay more attention to the losses caused by the occurrence of risks In order to encourage insurance institution to participate in risk management of mega projects, incentive measures need to be taken to dispel their concerns cost surrounding costs. This study is helpful to reduce the probability of risk occurrence so as to realize the sustainable development of mega projects and provides management suggestions for insurance institution to participate in risk management.