The Average Direct, Indirect and Total Effects of Environmental Concern on Pro-Environmental Behavior

Abstract

This research is framed in behavioral economics. This area tests the orthodox assumptions that individuals are rational, self-interested and possess all freely available information, and. Behavioral economics plays an important role for policymakers in areas such as environmental protection. We observe that despite being very concerned about environmental problems, the reality is that a great heterogeneity of behaviors is observed. Faced with the same level of concern, some citizens act coherently by adopting pro-environmental behaviors, while others do not. This latter response is supposed to generate cognitive dissonance. Accordingly, we expect that the levels of pro-environmental behavior should be more in line with observed levels of concern. Understanding pro-environmental behavior (PEB) is still a challenge. Insight into causal mechanisms of environmental concern on PEB could shed light on the effectiveness of environmental strategies such as land management, recycling, environmental taxes, water quality, human health, and prevention of further biodiversity loss. We employ a structural equation model to identify mechanisms through which environmental concern affects PEB. We prove that causal mechanisms between environmental concern dimensions, i.e., environmental concern in a broad sense, such as affection, cognitive, conative and active-are not independent. Additionally, we demonstrate that the average indirect effect (ACME), the average direct effect (ADE) and the average total effect (TE) of environmental concern on pro-environmental behavior depend on the baseline status of environmental concern in a narrow sense, i.e., worry or affection for environmental protection. The magnitude of the effects is also moderated by situational factors such as income, age, education, household size, and municipality size. This psychological construct (environmental concern) allows us to better understand the observed heterogeneity related to PEB which affects the economic efficiency of political measures.