When advisors do not know what is best for advisees: Uncertainty inhibits advice giving

Abstract

AbstractWhile seeking advice can be beneficial for advisees, advisors may not always possess the necessary knowledge to provide appropriate guidance. Poor‐quality advice can mislead advisees rather than offering assistance. Despite the research interest in advisees, few studies have investigated advisors' psychological and behavioral responses, especially when they faced uncertainty regarding the optimal course of action for advisees. To fill this gap, we developed novel paradigms aiming at manipulating advisors' uncertainty, allowing for a systematic investigation of advisors' behavior, motivation, and emotion. Across four studies, we consistently found that advisors under uncertainty give less advice. Furthermore, we observed that uncertainty modulates advisors' motivation to influence, worry about harm to others, and/or sense of power. The motivation to influence and/or worry about harm to others can mediate the effect of uncertainty on advice giving. Besides, we identified nuanced distinctions in the effects of ambiguity and risk, two distinct types of uncertainty, on advisors' psychological processes. Our findings shed light on advisors' self‐monitoring of the quality of their advice, thereby contributing to a deeper understanding of advisor–advisee communication from the perspective of advisors.