Facial Soft-biometrics Obfuscation through Adversarial Attacks

Abstract

Sharing facial pictures through online services, especially on social networks, has become a common habit for thousands of users. This practice hides a possible threat to privacy: the owners of such services, as well as malicious users, could automatically extract information from faces using modern and effective neural networks. In this article, we propose the harmless use of adversarial attacks, i.e., variations of images that are almost imperceptible to the human eye and that are typically generated with the malicious purpose to mislead Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). Such attacks have been instead adopted to (1) obfuscate soft biometrics (gender, age, ethnicity) but (2) without degrading the quality of the face images posted online. We achieve the above-mentioned two conflicting goals by modifying the implementations of four of the most popular adversarial attacks, namely FGSM, PGD, DeepFool, and C&W, in order to constrain the average amount of noise they generate on the image and the maximum perturbation they add on the single pixel. We demonstrate, in an experimental framework including three popular CNNs, namely VGG16, SENet, and MobileNetV3, that the considered obfuscation method, which requires at most 4 seconds for each image, is effective not only when we have a complete knowledge of the neural network that extracts the soft biometrics (white box attacks) but also when the adversarial attacks are generated in a more realistic black box scenario. Finally, we prove that an opponent can implement defense techniques to partially reduce the effect of the obfuscation, but substantially paying in terms of accuracy over clean images; this result, confirmed by the experiments carried out with three popular defense methods, namely adversarial training, denoising autoencoder, and Kullback-Leibler autoencoder, shows that it is not convenient for the opponent to defend himself and that the proposed approach is robust to defenses.