Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives

Published:2006-01 Issue:1 Volume:79 Page:145-179
ISSN:0304-405X
Container-title:Journal of Financial Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Financial Economics

Author:

Desai Mihir A.,Dharmapala Dhammika

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Strategy and Management,Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Accounting

Reference51 articles.

1. The tax shelter battle;Bankman,2004

2. The cash flow and informational effects of employee stock ownership patterns;Beatty;Journal of Financial Economics,1995

3. Executive compensation as an agency problem;Bebchuk;Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003

4. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are;Bertrand;Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001

5. Chen, K.-P., Chu, C.Y.C., 2005. Internal control vs external manipulation: a model of corporate income tax evasion. Rand Journal of Economics, forthcoming.

Cited by 1181 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Banker directors on board and corporate tax avoidance;Journal of Empirical Finance;2024-12

2. How does digital tax administration affect R&D manipulation? Evidence from dual machine learning;Technological Forecasting and Social Change;2024-11

3. The Parabolic Relationship of Tax Avoidance and Cost of Public Debt;Finance Research Letters;2024-11

4. Cultural norms and tax compliance: Evidence from China;Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization;2024-11

5. The impact of tax compliance on platform enterprises’ competitive advantage and the role of contract enforcement efficiency;International Review of Economics & Finance;2024-11