Author:
Grossman Sanford J,Perry Motty
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Reference17 articles.
1. Bargaining with incomplete information: An infinite-horizon model with two-sided uncertainty;Cramton;Rev. Econ. Stud.,1984
2. P. C. Cramton, “The Role of Time and Information in Bargaining,” Research Paper No. 729, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
3. The Role of Time and Information in Bargaining;Cramton,1984
4. Credible neologisms in games of communications;Farrell,1985
5. D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, and J. Tirole, Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information, in “Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining” (Alvin Roth, Ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press, London/New York, in press.
Cited by
147 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献