Affiliation:
1. Odeljenje za filozofiju, Filozofski fakultet Univerzitet u Beogradu
Abstract
In his famous article on epistemic structural realism from 1989, John Worrall
ascribed this position to Hanri Poicar?, which opened a new way of looking
at Poincar??s philosophy of science and provoked new debates concerning the
interpretation of his stance. It is well known that Poincar? argued for
conventional status of axioms of geometry and basic laws of mechanics and
consequently, he was mostly interpreted as instrumentalist and anti-realist.
In this paper I want to clarify structural elements in Poincar??s approach
to mathematics and physics. I will claim that Poincar? indeed assumed
certain version of structural realism and that his position is consistent if
his conventionalism is properly understood.
Publisher
National Library of Serbia