Game-theoretic agent-based modelling of micro-level conflict: Evidence from the ISIS-Kurdish war

Abstract

This article delves into the dynamics of a dyadic political violence case study in Rojava, Northern Syria, focusing on the conflict between Kurdish rebels and ISIS from January 1, 2017, to December 31, 2019. We employ agent-based modelling and a formalisation of the conflict as an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The study provides a nuanced understanding of conflict dynamics in a highly volatile region, focusing on microdynamics of an intense dyadic strategic interaction between two near-equally- powered actors. The choice of using a model based on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, though a classical approach, offers substantial insights due to its ability to model dyadic, equally-matched strategic interactions in conflict scenarios effectively. The investigation primarily reveals that shifts in territorial control are more critical than geographical or temporal factors in determining the conflict’s course. Further, the study observes that the conflict is characterised by periods of predominantly one-sided violence. This pattern underscores that the distribution of attacks, and target choices are a more telling indicator of the conflict nature than specific behavioural patterns of the actors involved. Such a conclusion aligns with the strategic implications of the underlying model, which emphasises the outcome of interactions based on differing aggression levels. This research not only sheds light on the conflict in Rojava but also reaffirms the relevance of this type of game-theoretical approach in contemporary conflict analysis.