The Disappearing Agent and the Phenomenology of Agency

Abstract

AbstractThe causal theory of action is thought to be plagued by the problem of the disappearing agent. However, philosophers have reached no consensus on the nature of this problem, let alone on whether it is solvable. In this article, I interpret the problem as a phenomenological challenge: the causal theory of action employs an event-causal framework, with which certain aspects of the phenomenology of agency seem incompatible. I examine two areas in which the phenomenology appears to speak against an event-causal framework: (1) the phenomenology of acting and (2) the phenomenology of making choices. Specifically, some philosophers have asserted that the phenomenology of acting involves content that action is caused by the agent themselves rather than by their mental states. Some philosophers have argued that the phenomenology of making choices involves content that the agent stands apart from their mental states in a way that allows them to reflect on, evaluate, or even manipulate their mental states. I argue that in neither case does the phenomenology pose a real challenge to the causal theory of action.