Persistence conditions: what they are, and what it is to have them

Abstract

AbstractIt is common among metaphysicians to talk about objects having persistence conditions or, equivalently, about the persistence conditions of objects. However, as frequent as these statements are, as rare are the attempts to clarify their meaning in a systematic manner. In the present paper, I try to provide such an explanation by considering in detail the question of what it is for an object to have persistence conditions. The central results are the following. First: that an object has (in contrast to merely fulfil) certain conditions of Fness means that it lies in the essence of this object that these conditions hold—that is, that it is part of this object’s essence that it is F, if it is F, in virtue of the fulfilment of these very conditions. Second: persistence is the staying in existence of an already existing object, which is why an object’s persistence conditions are just that: conditions of the staying in existence of this very object. On the emerging view, the persistence conditions of objects exhibit an interesting parallel to the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states or entities. As the latter, they are imposed upon the world by entities existing in the world, viz. objects.