Abstract
AbstractInSuppose and Tell, Williamson makes a new and original attempt to defend the material conditional account of indicative conditionals. His overarching argument is that this account offers the best explanation of the data concerning how people evaluate and use such conditionals. We argue that Williamson overlooks several important alternative explanations, some of which appear to explain the relevant data at least as well as, or even better than, the material conditional account does. Along the way, we also show that Williamson errs at important junctures about what exactly the relevant data are.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Logic
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