A Primer on the Game Theory Behind the National Resident Matching Program for the Medical Educator and Student
Author:
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Education,Medicine (miscellaneous)
Link
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s40670-020-00955-8.pdf
Reference13 articles.
1. Rees-Jones A. Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match. Games Econ Beh. 2018;108:317–30.
2. Canadian resident matching service [Internet]. CaRMS. CaRMS; 2018 [cited 2019Aug11]. Available from: https://www.carms.ca/
3. Kamada Y, Kojima F. Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a problem in the Japanese medical match and its solution. Am Econ Rev. 2012 May;102(3):366–70.
4. Roth A, Peranson E. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design. Am Econ Rev. 1999;89(4):748–80.
5. Gale D, Shapley LS. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am Math Mon. 1962;69(1):9–15.
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2. Correction to: A Primer on the Game Theory Behind the National Resident Matching Program for the Medical Educator and Student;Medical Science Educator;2020-05-08
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